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MONETARY POLICY RULES IN THEORY AND IN PRACTICE: 
EVIDENCE FROM THE UK AND THE US 
 
ABSTRACT 
Given the large amount of interaction between research on monetary policy and its 
practice, this paper examines whether some simple monetary policy rules that have 
been proposed in the academic literature, part of which has originated from within 
central banks, provide a reasonable characterisation of actual policy in the UK and 
the US. The paper finds that the simple rule that describes best actual US monetary 
policy is a speed limit rule with dynamics, whilst for the UK it is a forward-looking 
rule. The simpler dynamics in the UK’s monetary policy rule are reflective of the 
lower persistence of inflation as a result of its policy of inflation targeting. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Monetary policy is increasingly represented in the form of a rule, whereby interest 
rates – the policy instrument – respond to economic variables with the aim of 
achieving a pre-specified policy objective. 
 
The emphasis on rules harks back to the work of Friedman (1968) and Kydland and 
Prescott (1977). However, Friedman emphasised the importance of adherence to a 
rule in order to pre-empt attempts at stabilisation on the part of policymakers, given 
policymakers’ ignorance about the correct model of the economy.1 In contrast, 
Kydland and Prescott’s (1977) results stemmed from the monetary authority’s desire 
to raise output beyond its potential level.  
 
Interest in the use of monetary policy rules for stabilisation purposes gained 
prominence with New Keynesian models.2 Commitment to a monetary policy rule 
would be desirable provided the parameters in the policy rule remain within a 
reasonable range. Moreover, Taylor (1993) argued that US monetary policy could be 
usefully described not only by a mechanical rule but by a simple rule. In this case 
interest rates increased in response to rises in inflation above an implicit target and 
to a positive output gap.  
 
1 Given the assumption of the natural rate of unemployment (and interest) the real sector would 
inevitably always return to its natural rate, so that attempts at economic stabilisation could at most 
only help to bring this about at a faster rate. 
2 Also called New Neoclassical Synthesis models (Goodfriend and King, 1997) 
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However, it is worth emphasising that one should interpret empirical results on 
Taylor-type rules as parsimonious representations of central bank behaviour. This 
does not necessarily imply that a mechanical rule is being followed, or indeed, that 
the Taylor rule is the only way of describing the data.3
Research on monetary policy rules – and Taylor-type rules in particular– has 
expanded on many fronts. From the empirical side, researchers have attempted to 
better characterise monetary policy by considering different additional variables or 
generalising the functional form. 
 
From a theoretical perspective, most of the recent research has focused on the 
optimality of alternative monetary policy rules. This is generally done using 
stochastic dynamic general equilibrium (SDGE) models. Within this, some have 
posited ad hoc loss functions on the part of the central bank to derive the optimal 
monetary policy rule.4 A more theoretically satisfactory approach has relied on 
deriving the monetary policy rule that is obtained by maximising the welfare of the 
representative agent. The latter approach is obviously superior from a theoretical 
point of view, but may suffer from the fact that its conclusions could be specific to 
the model being studied and may not be robust to further modelling extensions. 
 
Although the optimal rule could in principle be very complicated, this paper will 
focus on simple monetary policy rules, that is, where interest rates respond to a small 
 
3 On this, see Carare and Tchaidze (2005) and Minford et al. (2002). 
4 See for example, Kobayashi (2005). 
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set of variables, with the Taylor rule being the most prominent example. Simple 
rules have the advantage of being clearly understandable and transparent, so that the 
objectives of monetary policy be well understood. Moreover, uncertainty regarding 
the future path of nominal interest rates would be reduced given the predictability of 
the rule.  
 
Whilst no central bank has publicly stated that it has followed an instrument rule, the 
Bank of England follows a targeting rule to implement its policy5 and the Fed’s 
monetary policy objectives consist of achieving high employment, stable prices, 
economic growth and balance in the international accounts.6 This would seem to 
imply that estimating monetary policy rules for these two economies would be a 
pointless exercise,7 given that their central banks do not explicitly follow them. 
However, Taylor-type rules do have some influence on policy8 and it could be 
argued that central banks implicitly follow them. This would not be surprising given 
the two-way influence between monetary policy and recent theoretical 
developments9. An additional reason for investigating the relevance of a Taylor-type 
rule for the UK and the US also lies in the fact that, as mentioned above, an interest 
rate rule may provide a parsimonious description of actual policy even when it is not 
 
5 Nikolov (2002). 
6 This lack of specificity implies that it follows neither an instrument rule nor a target rule.  
7 Carare and Tchaidze (2005) discuss additional dangers in the use of Taylor rules, especially when 
used for policy recommendations. 
8 Nikolov (2002) states that Taylor rules are used at the Bank of England as an indicator of the stance 
of current policy; Yellen  suggested that following a Taylor-type rule would represent good policy, 
which is remarkable when the alternative policy being considered was one of strict (over the medium 
term) inflation targeting, as argued by  Broaddus (Federal Reserve Board 1995, p. 39-44). 
9 Indeed, given that much research on monetary policy is conducted within central banks, the fact that 
some of the proposed rules analysed in this paper were published near the end of the sample period 
does not preclude their relevance. 
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adhered to by the monetary authorities. This is evidently relevant when one 
considers the large amount of research (especially for the US) that has found 
evidence of Taylor-type rules. 
 
This paper aims to combine the two lines of research discussed above by considering 
to what extent some of the proposed rules emanating from theoretical models reflect 
actual central bank behaviour. To the extent that theoretical contributions have been 
able to model central bank objectives and constraints successfully, these will be 
shown in the paper. 
 
II. PROPOSED RULES FOR MONETARY POLICY 
The volume edited by Taylor (1999) provided one of the first thorough analyses on 
the macroeconomic consequences of alternative monetary policy rules in the 
presence of nominal rigidities. One of the benefits of the Taylor rule lies in the fact 
that under reasonable parameter values it will generally ensure a unique and 
determinate rational expectations equilibrium.10 Furthermore, from an empirical 
point of view its simplicity would help in being understood by the public. However, 
some authors have proposed similarly simple rules that nevertheless may possess 
superior features to the Taylor rule. In particular, the standard Taylor rule takes the 
form: 
 
ttt xR 210 µµµ ++= (1) 
 
10 See Woodford (2003, p. 252-261). 
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where  denotes the inflation rate value and x denotes the output gap. 
That is, the nominal interest rate is adjusted each quarter to respond to deviations in 
the target values of inflation and output. However, most empirical studies on Taylor 
rule variants have found that the lagged interest rate enters (1) and that it is strongly 
significant, modifying (1) to: 
 
( )[ ] ttttt vRxR ++++	= 	1321031 µµµµµ (2) 
 
A theoretical rationale for the inclusion of the lagged interest rate in (2) can be found 
in Woodford (2003, p.280), in that the maintained high interest rates in response to 
rises in inflation or the output gap, for given 1µ , 2µ , have larger stabilising effects 
upon current output gap and inflation. A crucial feature that any monetary policy 
rule must possess is that it will ensure determinacy – both real and nominal – in the 
economy. The Taylor principle, 11 >µ , is generally a necessary requirement for the 
uniqueness and stability of the equilibrium.11 
Nevertheless, as Carlstrom and Fuerst (2000, 2001) demonstrate, the timing on 
which the monetary policy rule is based can also be crucial in order to prevent 
disastrous effects on the real economy. To avoid this Carlstrom and Fuerst propose 
either current or backward-looking Taylor rules. However, this conclusion runs 
counter to the professed approach of explicit inflation targeting central banks, which 
 
11 The general condition can be found in Woodford (2003, p. 255). 
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for the present paper is most relevant for the UK, as their approach is forward-
looking. Whereas backward-looking rules have been proposed on the grounds of 
avoiding indeterminacy, the rationale in support of forward-looking rules is based 
primarily on the fact that it takes into account the lags in the monetary transmission 
mechanism (Batini and Haldane, 1999). 
 
These two different Taylor-type rules, which differ on the timing of the explanatory 
variables to which the monetary policy instrument reacts can be succinctly 
represented as: 
 
( ) [ ] ttmtktjtt vRxER ++++	= 	++	 1321031 µµµµµ (3) 
 
Where j represents the possible information lag to which the central bank is 
subject.12 k (m) is a positive integer when the central bank reacts to expectations of 
future inflation (output gap), and a negative integer under a backward-looking 
Taylor-type rule.  
In contrast to the proposed rules where the only difference concerns timing, Walsh 
(2003) has argued that a speed limit policy dominates inflation targeting as long as 
the model is predominantly forward-looking, since under a discretionary policy the 
central bank is able to achieve higher social welfare when it reacts to changes in the 
output gap. Whereas the Taylor rule can be derived from quadratic preferences, a 
 
12 This would enable one to consider an operational monetary policy rule, as in McCallum and Nelson 
(1999). 
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speed limit rule implicitly embodies a more general form. Consequently, the rule 
proposed by Walsh (2003) would take the form: 
 
( )[ ] ttttt vRxR ++++	= 	1321031 µµµµµ (4) 
 
Lastly, another Taylor-type rule that has been prominent in the literature arises when 
one allows for a more flexible form of the central bank’s objective function or if the 
economy’s structure is non-linear. If the central bank’s loss function is asymmetric, 
so that negative and positive deviations in the inflation rate and the output gap are 
assigned different weights, the optimal Taylor rule would be non-linear.13 Then the 
Taylor rule (2) would be modified to: 
 
( ) [ ] tttttttttt vRxxxER +++++++	= 	136252421031 µµµµµµµµ (5) 
 
Hence, the Taylor-type rules that this paper will focus on are forward and backward-
looking rules, speed limit and non-linear rules, as well as the basic Taylor rule (2) 
which will be considered as the benchmark. 
 
III. PREVIOUS ESTIMATES OF SIMPLE MONETARY POLICY RULES 
Results from empirical studies that have estimated monetary policy rules have 
generally adopted one of two approaches. Most have been descriptive (Taylor, 1993) 
and have attempted to determine whether simple rules provide a useful description 
 
13 An insightful analysis of such preferences in a monetary policy context can be found in Nobay and 
Peel (2003). 
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of actual monetary policy behaviour. On the other hand, some authors have adopted 
a more normative approach, by characterising the monetary policy rules during 
periods of successful stabilisation and therefore attributing the superior outcome to 
the monetary policy rule of the central bank (Clarida et al., 2000).  
 
Although the Fed does not have an explicit inflation target, it is committed to 
achieving low and stable prices as well as promoting employment growth. This 
implies that a monetary policy rule as a function of inflation and some measure of 
real activity may provide a realistic description of actual behaviour. In this sense 
Taylor’s (1993) article, whilst using calibrated values in the policy rule, provided the 
first analysis of such a function. Furthermore, most estimated monetary policy rules 
for the Fed have found that a Taylor-type rule has provided a reasonable description 
of actual monetary policy. Clarida et. al. (2000) found that monetary policy during 
the Volcker-Greenspan years (1979:3 to 1996:4) was forward looking, in that the 
monetary policy instrument responded to forecasts of its target variables. More 
importantly, it satisfied the Taylor principle,14 with 3µ , the coefficient on the lagged 
interest rate around 0.80. Similar results are obtained by Nelson (2001) for the UK 
during the period 1992-97, whilst Adam et al. (2005) found that monetary policy 
was forward looking in terms of inflation, but responded to the current output gap.  
 
The robustness of the Taylor principle has also been found in other studies. Ball and 
Tchaidze (2002) analysed US monetary policy in terms of inflation and 
 
14 The coefficient on the output gap (incorrectly defined as hp detrended output) was also high, at 
0.93. 
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unemployment during the Greenspan years (1987-2000). They found that the rule 
had been relatively stable throughout the period once one allowed for changes in the 
NAIRU, with a coefficient on inflation of 1.29 for the “old economy” period (1987-
1995) and 1.54 during the “new economy” years (1996-2000). 
An additional issue concerns the inclusion of the lagged interest rate when 
estimating monetary policy rules. Although its inclusion is generally interpreted as 
reflecting partial adjustment in the behaviour of interest rates (Clarida et. al. 2000), 
Rudebusch (2002) has argued that the significant lagged interest rate is the result of 
serially correlated residuals. However, in attempting to disentangle the two effects, 
English et. al. (2003) found that the former argument is the dominant cause for the 
significance of the lagged interest rate. 
 
Meanwhile, Surico (2003) found evidence in support of an asymmetric Taylor rule 
for the Fed for the period 1997-2002, whilst for the UK Martin and Milas’ (2004) 
results indicate that the Bank of England for the period 1992-2000 responded more 
to upward deviations of inflation away from the inflation target than when below the 
target, despite the official objective being symmetric.  
More recently, Taylor and Davradakis (2006) using threshold models find that the 
Bank of England followed a forward looking Taylor rule when inflation was about 
half a percentage point above the inflation target. For inflation rates below this level 
the policy rule was best described as a random walk with a small positive coefficient 
on the output gap. 
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Regarding evidence on the speed limit policy, Peel et al. (2004) did find empirical 
support for a speed limit policy for the US, although to this author’s knowledge no 
research has been carried out regarding its relevance for the UK. 
 
Nevertheless, despite the vast amount of research on estimating monetary policy 
rules for the US – and to a lesser extent, the UK – there is no clear consensus on the 
interest rate rule that best characterises each economy during a common sample 
period, such as the Greenspan era in the US and the period of inflation targeting in 
the UK.  
 
IV. RESULTS FROM SOME PROPOSED SIMPLE INTEREST RATE 
RULES 
This section aims to compare the four monetary policy rules proposed by theoretical 
concerns using a common sample to determine if the behaviour of either the Fed or 
the Bank of England can be well characterised by one of these rules.  
Rules where the interest rate responds directly to the exchange rate have not been 
included in this paper. Taylor (2001) is sceptical of including the exchange rate in 
the policy rule, as it is likely to worsen the outcome of stabilisation policies. Further 
support for this point of view emerges from Allsopp et al. (2006), who argue that 
under an inflation targeting regime with a flexible exchange rate, the latter matters 
only to the extent that it affects the inflation rate, rendering a direct reaction to it 
unnecessary. 
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The results for the US are shown in Table 1 for the four rules considered in this 
paper. The data are quarterly and cover the period 1987:3 to 2004:4, which span 
most of the Greenspan years.15 
Several measures of inflation were considered, including the GDP deflator, but the 
best fit was provided by the annual rate of change in personal consumption 
expenditures less food and energy, which is generally interpreted as a measure of 
core inflation in the US. The output gap is defined as current GDP as a proportion of 
the Congressional Budget Office-derived potential output, whilst the interest rate is 
measured as the average federal funds rate. 
 
All rules are estimated by GMM16 using four lags of each explanatory variable as 
instruments, with the validity of the overidentifying restrictions confirmed the J-
statistic (p-values in parentheses). The null of residual normality (Jarque-Bera) is 
only rejected for the non-linear Taylor rule. 
In estimating the forward-looking monetary policy rule,  various timing horizons 
were considered, and only the one with the best fit is reported, which is the Taylor-
type rule where interest rates react to the forecast of inflation (the output gap) eight 
(four) quarters ahead. 
 
[TABLE I] 
 
15 All data were taken from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 
16 The backward-looking rule is estimated by least squares, with Newey-West standard errors in 
parentheses. 
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The models yield similar coefficients for the autoregressive parameter, over 0.80, 
which is consistent with the results obtained by Clarida et al. (2000). Whilst the 
Taylor principle is satisfied for all models – excluding the non-linear Taylor rule, 
which in any case performs poorly – although it ranges from 1.27 in the case of the 
pure Taylor rule (first column) to almost 3.9 under an inflation-forecast targeting 
rule. Similar results are obtained for the output gap, which is also significant in the 
first three models. Comparing the models on the basis of the Schwarz Bayesian 
information criterion (SBC) indicates that the standard Taylor rule provides the best 
description of the Fed’s behaviour, which could lead one to conclude that despite the 
desirable features in the other monetary policy rules presented, these are not 
applicable to the US economy.17 
However, despite the superior performance of the basic Taylor rule, the Q statistic is 
indicative of strong serial residual correlation, so that all of the equations may be 
mis-specified. This issue will be pursued further below. 
 
For the UK, the sample in which the monetary policy rules were estimated is 1992:4 
to 2004:4, which can be regarded as a single monetary policy regime,18 as the Bank 
of England had the official objective of an inflation target. The output gap is 
 
17 Obviously, more complicated rules are likely provide a more accurate description of actual interest 
rate behaviour, but this paper focuses on only a selection of simple rules with theoretical foundations.  
18 Adam et al. (2005) reported a change in regime pre- and post-independence of the Bank of 
England; however, Lord George, in an interview for the Financial Times on 2 May 2007, has stated 
that it was the introduction of inflation targeting and the general economic consensus in the UK that 
mattered most. 
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measured as the Hodrick-Prescott filtered level of GDP19 (with a smoothing 
parameter of 1600), whilst the interest measure is the official Bank of England rate.  
Again, several inflation measures were considered, with the measure that yielded the 
best fit being the annual rate of RPI inflation.20 Interestingly, the regressions with 
RPIY inflation – which removes the effects of indirect taxes – yield poorer results, 
despite the fact that Cutler (2001) found that it was the best predictor of future 
inflation, in other words, it could be defined as core inflation.  
 
Table 2 reports the estimates of the various models. It is interesting to note that the 
UK’s monetary policy rule that best describes the data corresponds to the one that is 
closest to research emanating from the Bank of England (Batini and Haldane, 1999 
and Nikolov, 2002), that is, a forward looking rule. For the sample considered the 
best fit is obtained when the forecast horizon is four quarters for both inflation and 
the output gap. As with the Fed, the Taylor principle is satisfied,21 although the 
coefficient on the output gap is higher than that on inflation, albeit less precisely 
estimated. Moreover, whilst for the US the results on inflation were generally 
consistent across models, at least with regards to the coefficient on inflation, for the 
UK results are highly sensitive to the timing of the Taylor rule. This is especially the 
case with  the backward-looking Taylor rule, indicating that the results are highly 
sensitive to the specified horizon.  
 
19 Although this is common practice, as mentioned earlier one should be aware that this is not the 
equivalent measure from a theoretical output gap measure. 
20 In the estimations, inflation is then RPI minus the official inflation target. Modifying this to the gap 
using first RPIX and then CPI inflation, the Bank’s official target, has not effect on the results. 
21 However, it is not significantly above unity. 
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[TABLE 2] 
 
Although the results from Table 2 are consistent with the accepted wisdom regarding 
the behaviour of the Bank of England, the Q-statistic again indicates substantial 
residual autocorrelation. Given that this paper has argued that the monetary policy 
rules being estimated are only rough approximations to actual central bank 
behaviour, as no central bank explicitly (and from the results, implicitly) follows a 
mechanical interest rate rule, monetary policy may also be responding to other 
events. However, a potential reason for the high Q statistic concerns the behaviour 
of interest rates and the modelling framework.  
 
Therefore, it could be argued that the dynamics of interest rates are not captured by 
the models presented above, but that an error correction form provides a superior 
representation of the data22. Early empirical support for this formulation can be 
found in Judd and Rudebusch (1998), in the form of a modified basic Taylor rule:23 
tttttt vRRxR +++++= 				 141312110 µµµµµ (6) 
 
To determine whether the residual autocorrelation is due to the fact of the poorer 
dynamics in the previous models, they are now presented in Table 3 for the speed-
 
22 In effect, equation (6) can be seen as a re-parameterisation of an autoregressive distributed lag 
(ARDL) model embodying an error correction model. Hence it can be interpreted as a Taylor rule but 
with richer dynamics. 
23 Their estimation was conducted by least squares on the grounds that given the lags in the monetary 
transmission mechanism, reverse causation from interest rates to inflation and output was unlikely. 
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limit and non-linear Taylor rules. In addition, difference rules have also been found 
to be optimal under a variety of contexts, with the underlying rationale being an 
extension to the inclusion of the lagged interest rate in the Taylor rule.24 The 
rationale is that the commitment to maintaining higher interest rates in the future in 
response to a positive inflationary or output gap shock in the present induces greater 
stabilisation in these two variables. 
In addition, Orphanides and Williams (2002) propose a difference rule on the 
grounds that it is more robust in the face of problems measuring the natural rate. The 
rule they put forward takes them form: 
 
ttt ueR ++= 210 µµµ (7) 
 
where ue denotes the unemployment rate.25 Giannoni and Woodford (2003) 
proposed an alternative rule, which can be interpreted as a speed limit rule that is 
optimal from a timeless perspective within the context of the model they analyse, 
and is represented by equation (8): 
 
1413210 		 ++++= ttttt RRxR µµµµµ (8) 
 
24 An important methodological issue concerns the stationarity properties of the interest rate. For the 
US, both the ADF and Phillips-Perron test reject stationarity at the 1% level, but not at the 5% level. 
For the UK, although the ADF test rejects stationarity at the 1% level, the Phillips-Perron gives the 
same results as for the US. Hence the results are not conclusive, but are indicative of substantial 
persistence in the series. Moreover, there are strong theoretical reasons to believe that the interest rate 
is a stationary series, especially in the case of an inflation targeting regime. 
25 This is measured as the civilian unemployment rate in the present paper. 
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Lastly, Walsh (2005) argued that a difference rule provide a robust simple rule when 
faced with possible parameter misspecification, especially regarding the degree of 
inflation inertia.26 This leads to the simple interest rule: 
 
ttt xR ++= 210 µµµ (9) 
 
Table 3 presents the monetary policy rules in differences for the US. Of the different 
measures of inflation considered, the best fit was provided by the quarterly 
percentage change in the GDP deflator (at an annualised rate). Although the 
dynamic Taylor rule provides a reasonable description of movements in the Federal 
funds rate, the best model is given by the speed limit policy, as initially put forward 
by Walsh (2003), but with allowance for richer dynamics.27 Moreover, the long-run 
response to the inflation rate of 2 is consistent with previous findings in the 
literature, whilst there is also a strong response to changes in the output gap, of 0.29. 
 
The monetary policy rules considered by Walsh (2005), and  Giannoni and 
Woodford (2003) also include a speed-limit component, which is even stronger, 
although less precisely estimated. In both cases the coefficient on inflation is 
strongly significant. Nevertheless, the Giannoni-Woodford rationale for the 
particular rule they derive does not provide an appropriate characterisation of 
interest rate behaviour, as the coefficient on the lagged interest rate should be 
positive.  
 
26 However, as Walsh also points out, this rule performs substantially worse than the optimal rule 
under more general misspecification. 
27 Previous empirical support for a speed limit rule was found by Peel et al. (2004). 
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Lastly, while in the non-linear specification the inflation rate provides little 
explanatory power, the Orphanides-Williams formulation yields a negative 
coefficient on the inflation rate. Their generally poor empirical performance is 
reflected in the high SBC values they yield. 
 
Overall, in analysing the Fed’s behaviour within the scope of simple interest rate 
rules, an error correction formulation in which interest rates follow a speed limit 
policy does seem to provide a reasonable characterisation of the data and this 
formulation has a theoretical basis to support it. 
 
[TABLE 3] 
 
The same models estimated for the UK are presented in Table 4, but none of the 
models can describe the data well. The Orphanides-Williams, and the Giannoni-
Woodford specifications suffer from the same problems as in the US estimation. The 
coefficient on inflation is strongly significant under the specification considered by 
Walsh (2005), although the change in the output gap is insignificant at the 10% 
level, whilst residual normality is also rejected. 
 
[TABLE 4] 
Page 18 of 28
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
Once again, the non-linear formulation is unsuccessful at characterising the data, 
with the coefficients on inflation being insignificant.28 However, in contrast to the 
US results, the interaction coefficient between output and inflation is positive and 
significant, as expected.  
Overall, within the model in differences, UK monetary policy is best described by a 
simple Taylor rule, although this is nevertheless a poor representation. There are two 
reasons why this result arises. First, UK monetary policy does seem to be more 
forward looking than in the US, so that rule (3) provides a better characterisation of 
interest rates. Secondly, and most importantly, there is evidence that inflation is a 
less persistent series under an inflation targeting regime;29 this can account for the 
support of the ARDL model for the US but its rejection in the case of the UK. 
 
V CONCLUSION 
In recent decades there has been a large amount of interaction between central bank 
and academic researchers on monetary policy issues, as pointed out by McCallum 
(1999). Among the most prominent topics have been not only the objectives of 
monetary policy, but also the variables that the monetary policy instrument, typically 
a short term interest rate, reacts to.  
It is generally agreed that a necessary criterion for any policy rule is that it should 
ensure determinacy and that this result be robust under a variety of models. 
Nevertheless, within rules that do yield a unique rational expectations equilibrium, 
 
28 A potential explanation is that the nonlinearity that best describes the data may be the one used by 
Taylor and Davradakis (2006) – a threshold model – and not equation (5). 
29 See Benati (2007). 
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different rules may possess additional benefits, such as being robust to parameter 
uncertainty, being more efficient (in the sense of Ball, 1999), or better capturing the  
preferences of policymakers. 
 
Although no central bank has indicated that it follows a mechanical policy 
instrument rule, economic research normally assumes or derives particular rules with 
the aim of analysing their consequences under different modelling formulations. 
Given that much f this research has been conducted within central banks, one could 
argue that some of the proposed monetary policy rules have emerged as a result of 
carrying out monetary policy, whilst at the same time policymakers are influenced 
by academic developments. In essence, although central banks may not adhere to a 
rule, given the interactions mentioned above it could be argued that a rule may 
provide a close description of actual monetary policy. 
 
Constraining the analysis to simple interest rate rules, this paper has considered 
whether some prominent simple monetary policy rules that have been proposed in 
the academic literature have been reflected in practice at either the Federal Reserve 
or the Bank of England. 
The introduction of inflation targeting seems to have led to a substantial decrease in 
inflation persistence, and this has been reflected in the rule that best characterises 
interest rate behaviour in the UK, that of a forward looking Taylor rule.  
Given that the US does not have explicit numerical objectives – as well as having 
real objectives – the simple monetary policy rule that provides a reasonable 
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description of interest rate behaviour is a speed limit rule. This follows Walsh 
(2003), except for the fact that it embodies richer dynamics in the form of an error 
correction model, or alternatively, in an ARDL representation. 
 
Thus both central banks’ estimated interest rate rules do have underlying theoretical 
support, and the particular rules that provide the best description of monetary policy 
in each country are consistent with their official policy objectives. 
 
Lastly, while a considerable amount of research has been devoted to estimating 
monetary policy rules under varying assumptions, there has been little effort to 
assess which of these rules provides the best description of actual behaviour using 
the same sample period. In focusing on a selection of simple rules, the results of this 
paper can be regarded as a first step in that endeavour. 
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Table 1. Estimated simple interest rate rules for the US (1987:3-2004:4) 
 
Taylor Rule Backward Taylor 
Rule 
Forward 
Taylor Rule 
 
Non-linear 
Taylor Rule 
Speed 
limit  
0µ 1.80 
(0.75) 
1.32 
(1.07) 
-4.19 
(1.52) 
-38.97 
(125) 
-4.84 
(2.38) 
1	tR 0.86 
(0.03) 
0.82 
(0.06) 
0.88 
(0.03) 
0.96 
(0.07) 
0.92 
(0.03) 
t 1.27 
(0.35) 
 36.0 
(104) 
3.82 
(0.78) 
kt+ 1.52 
(0.40) 
3.89 
(0.61) 
 
tx 1.36 
(0.17) 
 -9.87 
(17.9) 
 
ktx + 1.28 
(0.20) 
2.09 
(0.46) 
 
2
t -5.68 
(17.4) 
 
2
tx 0.58 
(1.70) 
 
tt x 6.93 
(12.1) 
 
tx 11.57 
(5.0) 
JB 6.4 4.48 1.63 13.0 0.15 
B-P-
L
15.0 59.1 50.1 51.6 18.5 
SBC -1.62 -1.50 -1.24 -0.91 -0.79 
J 8.7 
(0.36) 
 5.7 
(0.68) 
5.15 
(0.53) 
6.92 
(0.55) 
Notes: B-P-L denotes the Box-Pierce-Ljung Q statistic for residual autocorrelation to the 4th 
order, which is distributed as chi-squared (4) with critical value of 9.49 SBC is the Schwarz 
Bayesian Criterion and J is a test of overidentifying restrictions. k is  -1 for the backward-
looking model and 8 (4) for inflation (output gap) when forward looking. The backward-
looking rule is estimated by least squares (Newey-West standard errors in parentheses); all 
other rules are estimated by GMM with the Newey-West criterion being used to choose the 
lag truncation parameter. The different models are described in the text. 
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Table 2. Estimated simple interest rate rules for the UK (1992:4-2004:4) 
 
Taylor 
Rule 
Forward 
Taylor Rule 
Backward Taylor 
Rule 
Non-linear 
Taylor Rule 
Speed 
Limit 
0µ 5.16 
(0.37) 
5.01 
(0.26) 
5.19 
(0.51) 
14.88 
(58.99) 
4.58 
(0.37) 
1	tR 0.86 
(0.04) 
0.79 
(0.04) 
0.85 
(0.06) 
0.99 
(0.04) 
0.76 
(0.07) 
t -0.43 
(0.50) 
 7.38 
(34.9) 
0.71 
(0.40) 
kt+ 1.10 
(0.29) 
-0.17 
(0.67) 
 
tx 3.93 
(1.17) 
 33.45 
(152.1) 
 
ktx + 1.67 
(0.72) 
2.10 
(1.06) 
 
2
t -26.1 
(135) 
 
2
tx -25.9 
(133.6) 
 
tt x 81.5 
(391) 
 
tx 0.70 
(1.70) 
JB 1.12 4.76 1.1 1.1 2.64 
B-P-L 24.0 19.9 21.5 18.59 23.2 
SBC -1.59 -1.96 -1.62 -1.31 -1.40 
J 6.5 
(0.99) 
6.12 
(0.99) 
 4.27 
(0.99) 
5.68 
(0.99) 
Notes: As in Table 1, except that in the forward-looking model the forecast horizon 
for both inflation and the output gap are four quarters. 
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Table 3. Estimated simple differenced interest rate rules for the US (1987:3-2004:4) 
 
Taylor 
Rule 
Speed Limit Nonlinear Orphanides-
Williams 
Walsh 
(2005) 
Giannoni 
Woodford
0µ 0.17 
(0.10) 
-0.04 
(0.10) 
0.21 
(0.24) 
0.03 
(0.13) 
-0.58 
(0.19) 
-0.28 
(0.16) 
t -0.10 
(0.05) 
0.28 
(0.07) 
0.17 
(0.05) 
tx 0.55 
(0.18) 
0.68 
(0.15) 
1	t 0.10 
(0.04) 
0.10 
(0.04) 
0.11 
(0.20) 
 
1	tx 0.07 
(0.03) 
 0.11 
(0.05) 
 
1	tR -0.08 
(0.02) 
-0.05 
(0.02) 
-0.09 
(0.02) 
 -0.022 
(0.03) 
1	 tR 0.67 
(0.11) 
0.60 
(0.07) 
0.67 
(0.12) 
 0.48 
(0.10) 
1	 tx 0.29 
(0.09) 
 
2
1	t -0.002 
(0.04) 
 
2
1	tx -0.01 
(0.01) 
 
2
1	 tx
11 		 tt x -0.02 
(0.02) 
 
tue -1.95 
(0.18) 
 
JB 3.95 0.70 5.03 3.03 2.90 3.17 
B-P-L 0.27 0.16 0.26 10.5 15.6 0.72 
SBC -1.95 -2.07 -1.78 -1.59 -1.12 -1.45 
J 6.76 8.67 7.17 
Notes: As in Table 1. 
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Table 4. Estimated simple differenced interest rate rules for the UK (1992:4-2004:4) 
 
Taylor 
Rule 
Speed Limit Nonlinear Orphanides-
Williams 
Walsh 
(2005) 
Giannoni 
Woodford
0µ 0.74 
(0.32) 
0.85 
(0.49) 
0.58 
(0.25) 
-0.54 
(0.08) 
-0.08 
(0.05) 
0.58 
(0.41) 
t -0.15 
(0.08) 
0.15 
(0.03) 
-0.02 
(0.07) 
tx 0.59 
(0.37) 
0.65 
(0.35) 
1	t -0.08 
(0.06) 
-0.04 
(0.06) 
-0.03 
(0.09) 
 
1	tx 0.16 
(0.12) 
 0.14 
(0.16) 
 
1	tR -0.14 
(0.06) 
-0.16 
(0.09) 
-0.11 
(0.06) 
 -0.12 
(0.08) 
1	 tR 0.44 
(0.18) 
0.56 
(0.12) 
0.38 
(0.21) 
 0.53 
(0.12) 
1	 tx 0.15 
(0.11) 
 
2
1	t -0.02 
(0.11) 
 
2
1	tx -0.03 
(0.10) 
 
2
1	 tx
11 		 tt x 0.22 
(0.10) 
 
tue
JB  -3.88 
(0.59) 
 
B-P-L 7.4 31.1 0.48 0.16 155.3 57.5 
SBC 6.0 3.40 6.9 3.22 11.3 2.02 
J -1.80 -1.73 -1.73 -0.99 -1.15 -1.51 
4.50 7.3 5.29 
Notes: As in Table 1. 
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